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COURT-ORDERED RESTRICTIONS ON
TRIAL PARTICIPANT SPEECH
JONATHAN ERIC PAHL†
ABSTRACT
This Note considers court-ordered limitations on the extrajudicial
speech of trial participants in high-profile cases. After providing a
history of Supreme Court decisions, informative though not
dispositive of the topic, it presents the divergent approaches lower
courts take when faced with trial participants’ extrajudicial speech.
The Note highlights the extreme legal uncertainty facing trial
participants who desire to speak publicly about court proceedings.
Finally, it concludes that courts would better balance First
Amendment and fair trial values by rejecting the reasonable
likelihood of prejudice standard.

INTRODUCTION
The American justice system ushered in the new millennium by
playing host to some riveting drama: fraud perpetrated by Enron
executives, the murder of pregnant Laci Peterson, the Michael
Jackson child molestation case, and allegations of rape against Kobe
Bryant and Duke University lacrosse players. September 2007
accusations of a commando style raid1 refreshed the public’s memory
of the O.J. Simpson “trial of the century” just a decade earlier. While
the American fascination with wrongdoing and punishment continues
unabated, the established news media remain willing, if not eager, to
Copyright © 2008 by Jonathan Eric Pahl.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Williams College, B.A. 2003. I
thank Professors Stuart Benjamin, Jedediah Purdy, and Michael Tigar for reading early drafts.
Special thanks to Professor Erwin Chemerinsky for introducing me to this topic, to Mike
Rosenberg, Leeann Rosnick, Kelly Thomason, Hannah Weiner, and all the Duke Law Journal
editors who have provided advice and support.
1. Steve Friess, Simpson and Another Man Are Charged with Felonies in Taking of Sports
Items, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at A14.

05__PAHL.DOC

1114

4/16/2008 8:36:33 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1113

wax knowledgeable about the acts and lives of those engaged in
courtroom battles. CNN, Court TV, the twenty-four hour news cycle,
and the Internet contribute to the quantity of information broadcast
and published.
That this industry can fix its attention on legal proceedings is
profoundly beneficial. Legal reporting increases public knowledge
about the law and enhances deterrence. It may help marshal
resources for an innocent but poor defendant or convince a reluctant
witness to come forward. The freedom to speak about judicial
proceedings enables criticism of government ineptitude, corruption,
2
and malice, and it promotes a discussion about social change.
Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of
courts and suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of
judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can
contribute to public understanding of the rule of law and to
comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice
system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it
3
to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.

Widespread familiarity with the details of court cases, however,
threatens to prejudice the proceedings, particularly by influencing
potential jurors. Jurors too familiar with the arguments and facts may
be so predisposed to one outcome or another as to undermine the
trial itself, violating the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial
jury.4 “[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished
policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose

2. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy,
J.) (“Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account.” (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948))); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2007) (“[T]here are vital social interests served by the free
dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal
proceedings themselves.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer
Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 867–71 (1998) (emphasizing the value
of attorney speech).
3. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966)
(overturning a conviction because of extensive, prejudicial, and unmitigated publicity, and
noting that “[d]ue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2007) (“Preserving the
right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be
disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved.”).
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5
between them.” Yet courts must make determinations—about the
influence of speech on trials and what to do about it.
With the First Amendment precluding almost all gag orders on
6
the press, many courts limit publicity by demanding that attorneys
and trial participants refuse to engage the public through the media.
In four of the five cases already mentioned—the Laci Peterson, Kobe
Bryant, Michael Jackson, and Duke Lacrosse cases—the trial judge
ordered parties, witnesses, or their counsel to refrain from making
7
extrajudicial statements. In the fifth case, the Enron trial, the judge
twice refused requests to impose a gag order.8 Similar restraints on
speech are not unusual; trial participant gag orders are applied with
9
increasing regularity. The Supreme Court, however, has never
decided the constitutionality of these orders,10 and the lower courts
are divided three ways: some courts allow speech restrictions when a
judge identifies a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, others demand a
substantial likelihood of prejudice, and a third group of courts
proscribes all restrictions on speech absent a clear and present danger

5. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
6. See infra Part I.C. “The First Amendment in conjunction with the Fourteenth, prohibits
the government from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peacably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. I).
7. Judge Issues Gag Order in Peterson Case, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2003, at 16; Paul Pringle,
Judges Dim the Media Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, at A1 (“Gag orders have become a
fairly regular feature in celebrity court dramas—the Jackson and Bryant cases among them.”);
John Stevenson, Attorneys Want Gag Order Lifted; Lacrosse Players’ Lawyers Say ‘Court of
Public Opinion’ Is Necessary for Justice, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), July 22, 2006, at A1.
8. Request for Gag Order Declined by U.S. Judge in Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2005, at B4 (“The judge decided against a gag order for the second time this month, saying Mr.
Lay’s speech was a ‘drop in the bucket’ among [other forms of publicity].”).
9. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 859; Pringle, supra note 7.
10. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]either the Supreme
Court nor this Court has articulated a standard to apply when evaluating gag orders directed at
attorney or non-attorney trial participants.”); United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267,
1293 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“Gentile did not consider a ‘gag order’ at all.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1109 (2d ed. 2005).
Other Supreme Court cases approve gag orders to restrict attorney and trial participant
speech in particular contexts in accordance with practice at common law. Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984); Gannet Co. v. DePasquale 433 U.S. 368, 389 (1979). For
instance, speech may be curtailed to protect confidential information obtained through the nonpublic discovery process. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37. Also, speech may be “extremely
circumscribed” inside the courtroom, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).
This Note considers speech of a more general nature, recognizing that in certain limited
instances different standards of review may be appropriate.
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11
of prejudice. With the October 2006 denial of certiorari in Allred v.
Superior Court,12 the division persists.13
Lacking Supreme Court precedent directly on point, the
contours of the law are defined by related but not dispositive cases. In
Part I, this Note focuses primarily on four of these cases, providing a
historical perspective. Part II looks at the ways in which lower courts
have conceived of court-ordered restrictions on trial participant
speech, emphasizing the extent of the differences among them. Not
only are lower courts applying different standards to similarly
situated individuals, but many courts have expressed difficulty
understanding what the standards mean and how they relate to one
another. Part III argues that regardless of the confusion and the
variety of approaches, institutional concerns encourage the rejection
of the reasonable likelihood standard. It first suggests that the nature
of the contempt power and the collateral bar rule dangerously chill
speech, and it then focuses on the speculative nature of speech
restrictions. Courts must guess how speech will affect a trial, and they
should be careful to avoid elevating fair trial concerns over those of
the First Amendment.
Within the legal community, the propriety of extrajudicial
statements is contested. Some attorneys believe that representation of
14
high-profile clients demands engaging the broader public. Other
attorneys reject this view, suggesting that they best serve their clients
15
before the tribunal and the tribunal alone. This Note concerns the
speech of all trial participants, but it abstains from suggesting that
attorneys should either speak publicly or not speak publicly—a
decision involving considerations beyond the constitutional issues

11. See infra Part II.B. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has proposed a fourth approach yet
more protective of speech—an approach that would prohibit only false speech and only after a
finding of actual malice. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 884–87.
12. Allred v. Superior Court, 127 S. Ct. 80, 80 (2006).
13. See infra Part II.
14. According to one such attorney, “the publicity game has shifted into warp speed and it
would be absolute incompetence for an attorney to not be as prepared for handling his client’s
case in the courtroom of public opinion as he or she would at trial.” Terry Giles, Foreword to
JON BRUSCHKE & WILLIAM E. LOGES, FREE PRESS VS. FAIR TRIALS: EXAMINING PUBLICITY’S
ROLE IN TRIAL OUTCOMES, at vii, viii–ix (2004).
15. Brendan Sullivan of the law firm Williams & Connolly LLP explained his view in
unambiguous terms: “Never deal with the press, ever, never. It’s an absolute rule . . . . I know
law, I know juries and I know judges. That’s where my world is.” Jonathan M. Moses, Note,
Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1811, 1856 & n.243 (1995).
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16
presented here. Instead, this Note addresses the standards by which
courts measure trial participant speech, satisfied that the Constitution
may protect more speech than a lawyer’s social and professional
circles would condone.

I. HISTORY AND RELATED FREE PRESS / FAIR TRIAL CASES
Although modern communications technology may give the
press wide reach, the Supreme Court has called the free press / fair
trial debate “almost as old as the Republic.”17 In fact, it is older than
the Republic: the founders, wrote the Court, “were intimately
familiar with the clash of the adversary system and the part that
passions of the populace sometimes play in influencing potential
jurors.”18 When British soldiers fired into a Boston crowd in 1770,
their actions were met with revulsion. Paul Revere and Samuel
Adams published images of the Boston Massacre, a “slaughter of the
innocent, an image of British tyranny.”19 The soldiers’ appointed
attorney, John Adams, feared for his own life and that of his family
20
against the “prejudices” of the people. Despite the public outcry—
and following a continuance to allow some cooling off—the trial took
place locally in Boston; and the jury found the captain and most of his
men not guilty.21 A seminal event, the trial served as a “showcase [of]
both community rights and defendant rights.”22
Post-Revolution trials raised similar concerns. Nearly everyone
23
held opinions leading up to the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, presiding over the hearings, resorted to
24
extensive voir dire before he was able to seat an impartial jury. Early
16. See generally Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, When Talk Is Not Cheap:
Communications with the Media, the Government, and Other Parties in High Profile White
Collar Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 203 (2002) (“This article explores the risks
and benefits of addressing the media . . . . [T]alking may serve your client’s interest, but must be
done carefully, paying attention to the potential pitfalls . . . .”).
17. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
18. Id.
19. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2001).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 67–68.
22. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 237 (2005).
23. See Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 548 (“Few people in the area of Virginia from which
jurors were drawn had not formed some opinions on the case, from newspaper accounts and
heightened discussion both private and public.” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 49
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g))).
24. Id.
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in the twentieth century, newspapers and radio stations previewed the
trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping of the Lindbergh
25
26
baby, and the Scopes trial drew the attention of the nation. This
Part presents four Supreme Court cases that are part and parcel of
the debate about freedom of speech and fairness of trials. These cases
help stake out the boundaries of the debate over restrictions of trial
participant speech.
27

A. Contempt of Court and Bridges v. California

In 1941, the Supreme Court decided Bridges v. California. The
petitioner was an officer of a prominent union, convicted of contempt
when several California newspapers published a telegram he wrote
concerning ongoing judicial proceedings.28 Claiming a need to
preserve the fairness of the adjudicatory process, the state court
29
based its contempt conviction on inherent judicial power. The
Supreme Court, considering the extent of this power, “measur[ed] a
power of all American courts, both state and federal” to limit speech
by punishing its utterances.30 Compared with the First Amendment,
the Court found this inherent judicial power wanting and reversed the
lower court’s conviction.31
Contempt was “based on a common law concept of the most
general and undefined nature,” wrote the Court.32 An act of a single
judge, this means of punishment did “not come to [the Court] encased
33
in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation.” Moreover,
American constitutional history demanded caution before imposing
34
speech restrictions. Although English courts might have had the
power to punish extrajudicial speech for contempt, the interposition
of the First Amendment altered the judiciary’s powers, precluding
such punishment in the United States: “[T]he unqualified prohibitions
laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the
25. Id. at 548–49.
26. See generally EDWARD LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS (1997) (discussing the
controversy sparked by the Scopes trial).
27. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 274 (1941).
28. Id. at 276.
29. Id. at 259.
30. Id. at 260.
31. Id. at 278.
32. Id. at 260 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1940)).
33. Id. at 261.
34. Id. at 263–68.
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press . . . the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly
35
society.” The Supreme Court demanded that a trial court articulate
a clear and present danger of prejudice before exercising the
36
contempt power to punish extrajudicial speech.
The Bridges reasoning would seem to require a clear and present
danger of prejudice before trial courts can impose any order
restricting trial participant speech. In the decades following the
decision, however, this view has not been categorically endorsed.
37
B. Sheppard v. Maxwell and the Fair Trial Movement of the 1960s

In 1966, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Dr.
Sam Sheppard for lack of a fair trial.38 Allegations that Dr. Sheppard
murdered his pregnant wife sparked a firestorm of publicity, almost
39
all harmful to the defendant. Newspapers suggested that the accused
was not cooperating even though he had made himself available for
“extended questioning.”40 Reports implicated Dr. Sheppard for failing
41
to submit to a lie detector test and take a “truth serum.” Prosecutors
and police leaked stories to the press, including information about
evidence that was inadmissible at trial.42 In response to the demands
of editorial boards, a county official held a “three-day inquest” in a
43
packed high school gymnasium. There, government officials
questioned Dr. Sheppard for more than five hours even after his
44
attorney had been “forcibly ejected from the room.”

35. Id. at 265. The Court cited popular outrage against early American uses of contempt to
punish speech. Included in their examples was the case of Judge Peck, id. at 266–67, who in 1826
sent an attorney to prison for a day and stripped him of his law license for eighteen months after
the attorney published a criticism of Judge Peck’s opinion in a newspaper, Walter Nelles &
Carol Weiss King, Contempt By Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 428–29
(1928). Four years later, the House of Representatives voted 123–49 to present articles of
impeachment against Judge Peck. Id. at 429. Although the Senate acquitted Peck by the close
margin of 22–21, the impeachment served as a warning against judicial overreaching, and the
acquittal prompted an immediate legislative response: within two weeks, Congress passed and
the president signed a bill restricting federal judges’ power to punish by contempt. Id. at 430.
36. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263.
37. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
38. Id. at 356.
39. Id. at 335–42.
40. Id. at 338.
41. Id. at 339.
42. Id. at 360–61.
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id. at 340.
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The trial judge refused to grant a continuance, and the media
circus invaded the courtroom, where the judge created space for news
46
reporters within the bar. So many reporters attended and were
allowed so close to the defense table that counsel could not confer
47
with the defendant confidentially. During voir dire, the judge failed
to ask potential jurors about their exposure to publicity, and he failed
48
to demand that they avoid it. Despite the utter mismanagement of
the case, the trial judge refused to grant a new trial.49
50
In the face of this kind of “carnival atmosphere,” the Supreme
Court demanded that trial judges rein in their courtrooms:
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial
jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of
modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial
publicity from the minds of jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
51
accused.

The opinion set forth several actions a judge might take when
presented with a reasonable likelihood of prejudicial publicity. These
options included a continuance, forceful jury instructions, a change of
venue, and jury sequestration.52 The Supreme Court lamented the
trial judge’s failure to conduct probative voir dire and to ask jurors
53
about their exposure to publicity during trial. Finally, the Court
addressed the extrajudicial statements of police, witnesses, parties,
and counsel: “[C]ollaboration between counsel and the press as to
information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject
to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.”54 The statement has a questionable status as operative law,

45. Id. at 346.
46. Id. at 343.
47. Id. at 344.
48. Id. at 353.
49. See id. at 349 (“[The] defense counsel urged that [the failure to sequester the jury]
alone warranted a new trial, but the motion was overruled and no evidence was taken on the
question.”).
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. at 362.
52. See id. at 363 (“The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside interference.”).
53. Id. at 357.
54. Id. at 363.
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and has engendered disagreement both within the Court and the
55
bar.
56

C. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart and the Acceptance of a
Free Press
Ten years after its Sheppard decision, the Supreme Court
established an enduring standard for regulating the press. A smalltown murder received considerable publicity, and the judge enjoined
the news media from publishing or broadcasting information relating
to either confessions or facts that might implicate the defendant. The
state courts upheld the gag order, considering it an appropriate
response to a clear and present danger of prejudicial publicity.57 In
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, the Supreme Court agreed that the
state court had adopted the appropriate legal standard—the clear and
present danger standard—but it nonetheless reversed. Although
extensive and almost sure to reach nearly every member of the small
community, the publicity in the case, according to the Court, did not
meet that standard.58
The Nebraska Press Court expressed deep misgivings about the
use of prior restraints. By placing restrictions on the newspapers
before their publication, the trial court imposed “an immediate and
59
irreversible sanction.” This kind of restraint, wrote the Court, is “the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First

55. Compare, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (majority
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]he quoted statements from . . . Sheppard v. Maxwell[] rather
plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be
regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the
press . . . .” (citation omitted)), with id. at 1054 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (characterizing the
statements concerning the regulation of attorney speech in Sheppard as “obiter dicta” and
grounding Sheppard on “police and prosecutorial irresponsibility and the trial court’s failure to
control the proceedings and the courthouse environment”).
The ABA’s 1968 report, Fair Trial and Free Press, adopted prohibitions on extrajudicial
attorney speech presenting a “reasonable likelihood” of trial prejudice. ADVISORY COMM. ON
FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 80–95 (1968). As a constitutional
matter, the ABA justified these standards based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sheppard v.
Maxwell. Id. at 93. Later, however, the standards were revised. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.6 notes at 144–45 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (finding that courts should not be
able to restrict extrajudicial speech based on a mere reasonable likelihood of prejudice).
56. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
57. Id. at 545.
58. Id. at 569–70.
59. Id. at 559.
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60
Amendment rights.” Because these restraints are so antithetical to
the First Amendment, the Court demanded that “[a]ny prior restraint
on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against
61
its constitutional validity.” Moreover, the Nebraska Press Court
imposed an exacting standard, a “near absolutism” against courtordered restrictions on the press.62 Before enjoining publication or
broadcast, the opinion directed trial courts to consider three factors:
(1) the “nature and extent of pretrial [publicity]”; (2) whether other
measures—such as jury instructions, a continuation, or voir dire—
could mitigate the effects of the publicity; and (3) whether the
restraining order itself would be effective.63 But the expression of
these factors does not fully capture the level of scrutiny the Court
demanded. For a court to enjoin the news media, reports must be so
pervasive and so prejudicial that “[twelve jurors] could not be found
who would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to
render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in open
court.”64 The Nebraska Press standard has proved lasting, and it
helped justify greater media access to court proceedings in
65
subsequent years.
Nebraska Press did not directly address the speech interests of
66
attorneys and trial participants; the Court’s opinion expressly
declined to confront the issue.67 Other courts of the same era did
consider prohibitions directed at trial participant speech. For
68
example, in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, the Court of

60. Id. at 549.
61. Id. at 558 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1971)).
62. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 246 (1992).
63. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 562.
64. Id. at 569.
65. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (extending public and
press rights of access to preliminary hearings and the transcripts of those hearings); PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (requiring open, public court
proceedings during voir dire); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (opening criminal trials to the media).
66. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion referred to Sheppard, contemplating the
possibility of such restrictions. His opinion, however, did not address the standard by which such
restrictions might be imposed. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 601 & n.27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
67. Id. at 564 & n.8 (majority opinion) (“At oral argument petitioners’ counsel asserted
that judicially imposed restraints on lawyers and others would be subject to challenge as
interfering with press rights to news sources. We are not now confronted with such issues.”
(citations omitted)).
68. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered an attorney “nocomment” rule, modeled on the American Bar Association’s
69
Disciplinary Rule 7-107. The Seventh Circuit held that this rule,
requiring only a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, did not
70
sufficiently protect speech. Heightened scrutiny was required before
attorney speech could be so limited, and the court demanded a
71
serious and imminent threat, invoking the same level of scrutiny as
72
clear and present danger.
Acceptance of greater speech rights—both by the Supreme
Court and the Seventh Circuit—prompted reconsiderations within
the legal profession. The ABA’s Task Force on Fair Trial and Free
Press concluded in 1978 that the “reasonable likelihood test is too
relaxed to provide full protection to the first amendment interests of
73
attorneys.” Adopting the same serious and imminent threat standard
74
required in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, the ABA Task
Force valued speech about legal proceedings highly, calling it “pure
speech.”75
Despite the Task Force’s unequivocal language, the review did
not clarify the ABA’s approach. Because the ABA maintained
multiple guidelines through the 1970s, the Task Force’s review
created a confusing divergence in the ABA’s ethical precepts: As
revised after Nebraska Press and Bauer, Standard 8-1.1 required a

69. Id. at 274.
70. Id. at 247–50. The Bauer court did not classify the restrictions as prior restraints. It
noted, though, that the rules had “some of the inherent features of ‘prior restraints’” including
punishment by contempt. Id. at 249. They were thus deserving of greater scrutiny. Id. at 248–49.
A more detailed discussion of the difficulty with labeling trial participant speech restrictions as
prior restraints is included infra Part II.A.
71. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249.
72. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 & n.3 (1991) (majority opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.) (considering the serious and imminent threat standard equivalent to the clear
and present danger standard); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Standard 8-1.1 cmt. at 3 (Tentative Draft 2d ed. 1978) (“As a first amendment
formulation . . . the serious and imminent threat standard is substantively indistinguishable from
clear and present danger[.]”).
73. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard
8-1.1 cmt. at 3 (Tentative Draft 2d ed. 1978).
74. See id. at 4 (“[T]he serious and imminent threat terminology was and is a part of the
judicial gloss on the clear and present danger test and is not distinct from it. In view of the
apparent choice between equivalents, the clear and present danger language has been retained
in this standard.”).
75. Id. at 2 (citing Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586–87 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
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clear and present danger of prejudice before the curtailment of
attorney speech. Meanwhile, the older, reasonable likelihood
standard of Disciplinary Rule 7-107—which Bauer ruled
unconstitutional within the Seventh Circuit—remained effective in
many jurisdictions. These standards existed alongside one another
until the release of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility in the early 1980s.
76

D. A New Formulation and Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada

In the early 1980s, the American Bar Association completed a
reorganization of its Model Codes, incorporating the various
disciplinary rules, standards, and ethical considerations into a single
guide, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.77 The Model Rules
addressed trial publicity in Rule 3.6, prohibiting speech that an
attorney “knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”78
Within a decade, this language had been adopted by thirty-two
79
states, and it was the standard under which the State Bar of Nevada
sanctioned Dominic Gentile.80
On the day of his client’s indictment, after weeks of negative
81
publicity, Mr. Gentile held a press conference. He proclaimed his
client’s innocence, and he accused the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department of corruption—committing the crimes at issue and
covering its trail by wrongly accusing an innocent man.82 Mr. Gentile
spoke out months before a jury would be chosen, and he selected his
83
words carefully, acting with “considerable deliberation.” Before
speaking, he reviewed the Nevada trial publicity rule, which was
based on Model Rule 3.6,84 and at the press conference, he declined to
answer questions when he believed his responses might be
85
prejudicial. He did not discuss evidence, confessions, or the results

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT chairman’s intro. (Final Draft 1981).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (Final Draft 1981) (emphasis added).
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
Id. at 1033 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
Id. at 1033, 1039–41, 1045.
Id. at 1045, 1059–60 app. A.
Id. at 1042, 1044.
Id. at 1076 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1044–47 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
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of polygraph tests, even though the prosecution had already discussed
86
polygraph results publicly. Rather, Gentile limited his comments to
the broad strokes of the defense: his client was not guilty because he
was not the perpetrator; the perpetrator was Detective Steve Scholl of
the Las Vegas Police Department.87 These allegations held up in
court. Not only was Gentile’s client acquitted but jurors later said that
they would have convicted Detective Scholl had his name been on the
verdict form before them.88 Nonetheless, the State Bar of Nevada
disciplined Gentile for his speech.89
On review, the Supreme Court issued a fractured set of opinions.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion disposed of the case, striking down
Nevada’s publicity rule as void for vagueness and accordingly setting
aside the state bar’s disciplinary measures.90 Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Rehnquist garnered a slim, five-Justice majority upholding the
91
substantial likelihood standard. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
attorneys are especially authoritative, and hence prejudicial, sources.
As officers of the court, attorneys bear a special responsibility to limit
the costs that extrajudicial speech imposes on court proceedings.
“Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in
the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some
adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as
well as their conduct.”92 Gentile permits state bar associations to
regulate extrajudicial attorney speech based on a standard less
93
protective than clear and present danger. Neither Justice Kennedy’s
opinion nor Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion addressed the
standards to measure similar restrictions imposed by courts.
*

*

*

86. Id. at 1046.
87. Id. at 1041–48.
88. Id. at 1047–48.
89. Id. at 1033.
90. Id. at 1048–51 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.). On the void-for-vagueness issue,
Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. Id. at
1032, 1048–51.
91. Id. at 1068–76 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). With Chief Justice Rehnquist on
this question were Justices White, Scalia, Souter, and O’Connor. Id. at 1032, 1068–76.
92. Id. at 1074.
93. See id. (“[T]he speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated
under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
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Bridges v. California presents a straightforward way to consider
court restrictions on attorneys. It suggests that courts cannot use
contempt to punish trial participant speech absent a clear and present
danger of prejudice. As reiterated in a similar context in Nebraska
94
Press, this is a high standard indeed, a “near absolut[e]” ban on such
orders. As this Part explained, however, the Supreme Court may have
abandoned this approach without ever overruling it, and, as the next
Part illustrates, lower courts have demonstrated a willingness to
follow Sheppard v. Maxwell and Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.
Sheppard and Gentile present two other approaches to evaluate the
relationship between First Amendment rights and fair trial rights. If
applied to trial participant speech restrictions,95 the disputed language
in Sheppard would invite courts to limit trial participants’ speech on
the basis of a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. The substantial
likelihood standard approved in Gentile would seem to establish
intermediate scrutiny, splitting the difference between the strict
scrutiny of clear and present danger and the deference to the
judgment of trial courts embodied in the reasonable likelihood
standard. Neither Sheppard nor Gentile, however, are directly on
point. Sheppard’s application to speech restrictions is disputed,96 and
Gentile considered an after-the-fact punishment imposed by a state
bar association rather than a prospective, court-ordered restriction on
speech.
II. COURT-ORDERED SPEECH RESTRICTIONS:
METHODS AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Although none of the Supreme Court cases discussed in Part I
directly addressed court-ordered restrictions on extrajudicial speech,
several lower court cases have considered the issue. This Part
discusses the different standards applied by lower courts. Section A
presents a typology of methods courts have used to restrain trial

94. SMOLLA, supra note 62, at 246.
95. Lower courts have noted the inapplicability of Gentile to court-ordered restrictions on
speech. E.g., United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]either the Supreme
Court nor this Court has articulated a standard to apply when evaluating gag orders directed at
attorney or non-attorney trial participants.”); United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267,
1293 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“Gentile did not consider a ‘gag order’ at all.”); see also In re Morrissey,
168 F.3d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1999) (“It cannot be said . . . that Gentile stands for the proposition
that the ‘substantially likely’ standard is the only constitutionally permissible standard for
restrictions on lawyer speech under the First Amendment.”).
96. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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participant speech. Section B demonstrates the discord in the
standards courts use to evaluate these restrictions, noting divergences
in both the standards themselves and the principles supporting the
standards, both between circuits and within circuits. Section C
underscores this uncertainty by discussing the confusion that several
courts have expressed about the meaning of the substantial likelihood
standard. Given the various methods courts can use to restrict speech,
the uncertainty about the standards courts will apply to review those
restrictions, and the confusion about the meaning of the standards,
the jurisprudence provides courts and trial participants little, if any,
guidance.
A. Five Types of Court-Ordered Restrictions on Speech
Judges can limit and restrict extrajudicial speech in at least five
different ways. First, courts can issue an outright ban on speech
related to the trial, enjoining participants from making any
communications with the public about the case. Violation of the order
is enforced through contempt, and the order bars all communication
related to the pending proceedings. One example is the order barring
the speech of Gloria Allred, an attorney for a witness in a high-profile
criminal case, People v. Dyleski.97 The California Superior Court
ordered trial participants to “refrain from discussing this case, the
evidence expected to be used in the case, or the issues in the case, the
merits of the case, or trial tactics or strategy, with the media or in an
otherwise public fashion.”98 The order contained no exceptions or
limitations, banning all speech related to the case in any way.99
A second kind of court-ordered restriction functions in the same
way, but its scope is expressly qualified. This type of injunction
incorporates one of the standards used in contemporary or past
versions of the ABA’s Model Rules and Codes—reasonable
likelihood, substantial likelihood, or clear and present danger.100 This
was the type of qualification included in the gag order issued in the
Kobe Bryant rape case. The order banned speech the participant

97. People v. Dyleski, No. 3-219113-8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2005) (protective order),
aff’d sub nom. Allred v. Superior Court, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 3495 (Mar. 15, 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 80 (2006).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. At least one such order adopted in full the local ethics rule governing trial publicity.
Constand v. Cosby, 229 F.R.D. 472, 477–78 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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“knows or reasonably should know . . . will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in
101
th[is] matter.” This second type of order is distinct from the first
because, on its face, it is more narrowly tailored. It does not preclude
all speech about the trial, but only speech sufficiently likely to
prejudice the proceedings. The inclusion of this “likelihood standard”
allows trial participants to gamble, risking punishment if the judge
considers their speech more prejudicial than it was intended. In
practice, though, this kind of order may be just as restrictive as a
complete ban, precisely because the “likelihood standard” does not
specifically define speech that is acceptable and speech that is not
acceptable. Because of the collateral bar rule,102 would-be speakers
may avoid violating the order by not speaking at all.
The third and fourth methods rely on local rules of the court.
Similar to bar association ethics rules, these court rules typically
proscribe certain types of trial participant speech, often tracking the
103
language of the ethics rules. These court rules may incorporate one

101. People v. Bryant, No. 03 CR 204, at 2 (Colo. Eagle County Ct. July 24, 2003) (order
governing pretrial publicity).
102. See infra Part III.A.
103. See, e.g., M.D.N.C. LOCAL CR. R. 57.2. These North Carolina rules prohibit statements
concerning six categories of speech:
1. The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests,
indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
2. The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
3. The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
4. The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
5. The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
6. Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the
merits of the case.
M.D.N.C. LOCAL CR. R. 57.2(a)(2). This Rule also contains safe harbors, permitting speech
about the identity of the victim and the accused, warnings to protect the public from danger,
requests for assistance in obtaining evidence, the nature of the charge and denials of the charge,
and scheduling information. M.D.N.C. LOCAL CR. R. 57.2(a)(3). This particular court rule,
however, does not contain a safe harbor included in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—
the right to respond to a previous prejudicial dissemination against a client made by someone
else. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (2007) (“[A] lawyer may make a
statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer’s client.”). As
mentioned in Part I.D, the publicity rules at issue in Gentile were held unconstitutional as void
for vagueness. This infirmity stemmed from an unclear relationship between one of the safe
harbor provisions and the rest of the rule.
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104
of the likelihood standards, or they may not. The existence of court
rules underlies two distinct methods of speech limitation. The
existence of the rules themselves is one method. The other method of
rule-based restriction arises when the judge puts the parties on notice.
In some cases, a judge will issue an opinion reminding the parties of
the rules.105 By alerting them to the court rules, the judge turns
regulations of a general nature into personal commandments and
indicates a willingness to enforce them. Some judges express
frustration with this suggestion—believing that the judge’s reiteration
of preexisting rules is legally irrelevant because trial participants are
already on notice.106 Others, however, argue that personal notice is
one of the most chilling characteristics of prior restraints.107
Personalized speech restrictions induce self-censorship by alerting
those warned to the possibility of sanction and by increasing the
likelihood the rules will be enforced.108
A fifth type of restriction involves no notice to the parties of any
kind. This method allows a court to prosecute extrajudicial statements
for contempt based only on the inherent powers of the court. Unlike
a gag order or punishment by court rules, this judicial action bears no
characteristics of prior restraint.109 The speech of parties is not
controlled in advance; the parties are not warned in advance. This
kind of restriction, however, is not the central focus of this Note; it is
a retrospective punishment, and Bridges v. California largely

104. Compare N.D. ILL. LOCAL R. 83.53.6 (barring extrajudicial statements presenting a
serious and imminent threat of prejudicing the proceedings), and S.D.N.Y. LOCAL CR. R. 23.1
(using the substantial likelihood standard), and E.D. PA. LOCAL CR. R. 53.1(a)(1) (adopting the
reasonable likelihood standard), with M.D.N.C. LOCAL CR. R. 57.2(a) (adopting no particular
standard and instead only barring speech on specified subjects—such as character of a witness,
the possibility of a plea, a request for assistance in obtaining evidence, and others).
105. E.g., United States v. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064–65 (D. Mont. 2005) (noting
that the parties are “aware of the rules and of this Court’s expectation that they be followed”);
Rossbach v. Rundle, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (refusing to issue a “gag order”
but noting that “[t]he United States is aware of the [local] rules and this court’s expectation that
they be followed”).
106. See, e.g., Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–65 (refusing to “micromanage the progression
of th[e] case” and rejecting the necessity of filing “a motion seeking nothing more than the
Court’s affirmation of rules and orders already in effect”).
107. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 11, 35–43 (1981) (cautioning that considerable self-censorship occurs in the wake of
personal injunctions or permit denials).
108. Id. at 37 (“[E]ven speakers who would have been informed in any event about the
pertinent laws restricting speech might be more preoccupied by the threat of sanctions after
receiving the [implicit] rebuke . . . .”).
109. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
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110
For a court to
forecloses this use of the contempt power.
constitutionally assert inherent power to punish extrajudicial
statements, it must meet strict scrutiny—acting only to avert clear and
111
present danger.

B. Extreme Divergences in the Lower Courts
The lower courts have divided over which constitutional standard
to use when considering prospective, court-ordered restrictions on
trial participant speech. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have
required only a reasonable likelihood of prejudice before allowing
courts to regulate trial participant speech.112 The Third and Fifth
Circuits have approved regulations upon a substantial likelihood of
113
prejudice, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits proscribe
judicial action absent a clear and present danger of material prejudice
or, equivalently, a serious and imminent threat of material
prejudice.114 State courts interpreting federal law have also diverged
on the applicable standard.115 The articulation of this split of
authority, though, gives only a partial picture. In reality the
divergences run deeper.
District courts in some circuits that have not yet spoken to the
issue have used all three approaches. For instance, district courts in

110. For a discussion of Bridges, see supra Part I.A. The case rejected “the contention that
the criteria applicable under the [First Amendment of the] Constitution to other types of
utterances are not applicable, in contempt proceedings, to out-of-court publications pertaining
to a pending case.” Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263–68 (1941).
111. See Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263 (concluding that “the ‘clear and present danger’ cases
[establish] a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished” and that the “First
Amendment . . . must be taken as a command of the broadest scope”).
112. In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 139–40 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Application of Dow Jones &
Co., 842 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.
1969).
113. United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 93 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d
415, 428 (5th Cir. 2000).
114. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1987); Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for
the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985); Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975). The equivalence of these two standards is described supra notes
72, 74 and accompanying text.
115. Compare Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1336–37 (Ill. 1986) (requiring
clear and present danger), and Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332, 335 (N.M. 1996) (same), with
State v. Bassett, 911 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1996) (per curiam) (applying the reasonable
likelihood standard).
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116
the Eleventh Circuit have decided cases under each standard. Even
when a court of appeals has decided a question about trial participant
speech, subsequent decisions from other courts within that circuit
sometimes follow the appellate court’s lead and other times eschew
its approach. For example, a deviation occurred in the Third Circuit
when the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
looked to Fourth Circuit law rather than a more recently decided
Third Circuit case.117 Likewise, the Second Circuit has considered two
different standards within two years of each other,118 and a subsequent
119
case in the Southern District of New York seems to apply the third.
Just as Gentile decided the permissibility of the substantial likelihood
standard without mandating it or reaching the constitutionality of the
other standards, the Fifth Circuit has approved the substantial
likelihood standard for trial participant gag orders without approving

116. Compare United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1293–94 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(adopting clear and present danger), with United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6711, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 2004) (substantial likelihood), and United
States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (declining to adopt a single standard, but
approving a gag order under all three standards).
117. United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 37612, at *17 (W.D. Pa.
June 8, 2006) (“[u]sing the analysis set forth by the Fourth Circuit” in a 1999 opinion, Morrissey,
168 F.3d at 138–40, rather than the standard approved by the Third Circuit in Scarfo, 263 F.3d at
93). Subsequently, the Third Circuit considered Wecht on appeal, and required at least a
substantial likelihood of prejudice before imposing a penalty. United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d
194, 205 (3d Cir. 2007). The court intended to eliminate the multiplicity of standards within the
Third Circuit. Id. at 206.
118. Compare United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(substantial likelihood), with United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasonable
likelihood). Arguably, neither of these cases applied any standard relevant to this Note. In
Salameh, the Second Circuit discussed the substantial likelihood standard but disposed of the
case on alternate grounds, deciding that the trial court’s order was not narrowly tailored—that
the trial court should have considered alternatives to a “blanket prohibition.” Salameh, 992 F.2d
at 447. In Cutler, the Second Circuit dismissed the attorney’s constitutional claim due to the
collateral bar rule. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 832–33; see also Wecht, 484 F.3d at 204 n.8 (noting that
the Second Circuit disposed of Cutler “[a]t the outset of its discussion,” based on the collateral
bar rule). Nonetheless, both Salameh and Cutler articulated different standards, with the
Salameh court looking to the substantial likelihood standard and the Cutler court looking to the
reasonable likelihood standard. The divergence at least suggests some confusion about the law
or, in Salameh, possibly a willingness to deviate from the reasonable likelihood standard
articulated in In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988).
119. See United States v. Gotti, No. 04 Cr. 690 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24192, at *12–
14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2004) (denying a request for a gag order and noting that “a court may
abridge a witness’s First Amendment rights only when absolutely necessary to ensure the
accused’s right to a fair trial”).
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120
or disapproving the reasonable likelihood standard. One district
court, the District Court for the District of Kansas, used two different
standards in two different cases.121 One of these standards followed
122
the approach approved by the Tenth Circuit; the other did not.
The justifications for these distinctions are equally dizzying.
123
Citing the “officer of the court” rationale, some courts differentiate
between lawyers and parties, applying greater First Amendment
scrutiny when a party contests the order than when a nonparty
124
125
contests the order. Other courts do not recognize this distinction.
Some courts require greater scrutiny before limiting speech of
witnesses; other courts treat witnesses, parties, and attorneys the
126
same. Some courts apply greater scrutiny when a trial participant
contests the restrictions and less scrutiny when the media contests the
restrictions. As with the other divergences, this distinction has not
been universally recognized.127

120. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 427 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We do not address whether
a trial court may impose a . . . gag order based on a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of prejudice.”).
121. Compare United States v. Walker, 890 F. Supp. 954, 957 (D. Kan. 1995), aff’d, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 8684 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 1996) (substantial likelihood), with United States v.
Pickard, No. 00-40104-01/02-RDR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2002)
(reasonable likelihood).
122. In United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir. 1969), the Tenth Circuit
adopted the reasonable likelihood standard.
123. Justice Rehnquist used the officer of the court rationale in the Gentile opinion to justify
a lesser standard of scrutiny for bar association punishment of attorney speech. See supra note
92 and accompanying text.
124. See United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“This
case is also different from most of the ‘gag order’ cases because the restraint would apply to
Carmichael himself and not to his attorneys. Thus, the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Gentile
that attorneys are subject to greater restrictions on their speech is inapposite.”).
125. E.g., Brown, 218 F.3d at 427–28 (“[T]he interests of the lawyers and the parties in
‘trying the case in the media’ were (and continue to be) the same.”).
126. Compare United States v. Gotti, No. 04 Cr. 690 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24192, at
*6, *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2004) (drawing distinctions between speech restrictions applied to
witnesses and those applied to other parties), with People v. Dyleski, No. 3-219113-8 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2005) (protective order), aff’d sub nom. Allred v. Superior Court, 2006 Cal.
LEXIS 3495 (Mar. 15, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 80 (2006) (imposing and upholding a gag
order on parties and witnesses alike).
127. Compare CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975) (“Although the news
media are not directly enjoined from discussing the case, it is apparent that significant and
meaningful sources of information concerning the case are effectively removed from them and
their representatives. To that extent their protected right to obtain information concerning the
trial is curtailed and impaired.”), with In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609
(2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between a gag order challenged by the
individual gagged and one challenged by a third party . . . .”).
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With so many different fault lines in this jurisprudence, it would
be tempting to say that during the sixteen years following Gentile, the
judiciary developed a set of approaches to trial participant speech
that resembles a patchwork quilt. This, however, would belie the
extent of the discord by implying that the differences are fixed and
discernable. Instead, they are unpredictable and in some jurisdictions,
128
they change. The result for litigants is a profound uncertainty about
which standards will be used to judge their out-of-court speech.
C. Substantial Likelihood Confusion: A Doctrinal Infirmity?
Uncertainty is not limited to questions about which standard will
apply but extends to the meaning of those standards. This Note has
thus far considered three constitutional standards for regulating
attorney speech: reasonable likelihood, which is most permissive of
speech restrictions; clear and present danger, which is least permissive
of speech restrictions; and the intermediate standard approved in
Gentile, substantial likelihood of material prejudice. The discussion
has suggested that these imply three different levels of scrutiny; and
writing for a Gentile majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly
contemplated three distinct levels of First Amendment scrutiny. He
described the reasonable likelihood standard as “less protective of
lawyer speech” than the substantial likelihood standard.129 He
described substantial likelihood, in turn, as a “less demanding
130
standard” than clear and present danger. In the years since Gentile,
other courts have also recognized three distinct levels of scrutiny.131
The three phrases are rhetorically distinct, and they seem to
imply three levels of scrutiny: some, more, most. Courts, however,
have expressed difficulty in distinguishing “substantial likelihood”
132
from both its semantic neighbors. As a matter of definition, their
confusion is well founded: dictionary definitions do not provide clear

128. See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
129. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 (1991) (majority opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.).
130. Id. at 1074.
131. E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1293 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“A
three-way circuit split exists with respect to . . . the threshold standard for imposing a prior
restraint.”); Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Allred, 127 S. Ct. 80 (No. 05-1505)
(“[T]hree distinct, conflicting approaches have emerged Among [sic] the Federal Circuits.”).
132. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036–37 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d
415, 427 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6711, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 2004).
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133
guidance. If “substantial” means “not illusive,” it would seem to
imply nontrivial and would approximate “reasonable.” On the other
hand, if “substantial” means “specified to a large degree or in the
134
main,” it would seem to suggest more than merely “reasonable” and
be closer to “clear and present danger.” Though the origins of the
substantial likelihood standard suggest it is more akin to clear and
present danger, since Gentile, courts have more often associated it
with the reasonable likelihood standard.

1. The Inception of “Substantial Likelihood.” In 1977 the
American
Bar
Association
initiated
a
“comprehensive”
reconsideration of its ethical precepts.135 Completed in 1981 by the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, the revision
included Model Rule 3.6, which governed trial publicity and included
the “substantial likelihood” language.136 The notes in the Proposed
Final Draft are revealing. The Commission rejected the possibility
that the substantial likelihood standard would resemble the
reasonable likelihood standard.137 When presented with a reasonable
likelihood of prejudice, courts had other means to limit the damage of
138
speech: voir dire, jury instructions, continuances, and others.
The Commission sided with the holding of Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer and with the late 1970s Task Force on Fair Trial
and Free Press. Although it adopted the substantial likelihood
language, it made clear that “[t]he formulation in this Rule
139
incorporates a standard approximating clear and present danger.”
The use of alternate language to approximate clear and present
danger was not altogether unusual. Another formulation—a serious

133. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2280 (1993).
134. Id.
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT chairman’s intro. at i (Proposed Final Draft
1981). See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (Final Draft 1981). By the time Gentile
was decided a decade later, thirty-two states had adopted the rule. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068.
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. at 144–45 (Proposed Final Draft
1981). The commentary notes that the reasonable likelihood standard is the proper “basis for
limiting the consequences of anticipated speech” through measures that do not resrict speech,
such as change of venue. Id. (emphasis added). The substantial likelihood standard is required,
however, as “the basis for punishing speech.” Id.
138. See id. (describing other possible “remedial measures” available when a court finds a
reasonable likelihood of prejudice, including “continu[ing] the case until the threat abates . . .
[or] transfer[ring] it to another county”).
139. Id. at 144.
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and imminent threat—was used contemporaneously, and is still used,
140
to invoke clear and present danger. Justice Kennedy noted much of
this history in his opinion in Gentile.141
By upholding the substantial likelihood standard in Gentile,
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion approved a standard meant to
“approximate” the speech protections of clear and present danger.142
Yet in affirming its use, the Court approved what it considered a “less
demanding standard,”143 birthing a new level of scrutiny for attorney
144
speech.
2. Post-Gentile Confusion. In the years since Gentile, lower
courts have imposed gag orders on attorneys and other trial
participants based on the substantial likelihood standard. Though
many courts conceive of this standard as a distinct form of
intermediate scrutiny, others struggle to understand its independent
meaning. Although the standard was originally conceived as
“approximating” strict scrutiny,145 these courts are easily divorcing
substantial likelihood from clear and present danger.
The meaning of the term has changed, but it is not clear how
much. Some courts express difficulty distinguishing substantial
likelihood from the most deferential standard, reasonable likelihood.
146
In United States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “The difference

140. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
141. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. at 145 (Proposed Final Draft 1981);
see also Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036–37 (observing that, “[i]nterpreted in a proper and narrow
manner . . . the phrase substantial likelihood of material prejudice might punish only speech that
creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm” and that “the difference
between . . . serious and imminent threat . . . and . . . substantial likelihood of material prejudice
could prove mere semantics”).
143. Id. at 1074 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
144. Ironically, the American Bar Association, whose commission had promulgated the
rules, filed an amicus brief in Gentile, disavowing its earlier statements indicating that
substantial likelihood was intended to “approximate” clear and present danger. See Brief of the
ABA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (No. 891836) (“[T]he drafters stopped short [of] adopting the ‘clear and present danger’ test and
endorsed instead a ‘substantial likelihood of material prejudice’ as the appropriate test. The
drafters felt that the ‘substantial likelihood test,’ rather than the ‘clear and present danger’ test,
struck the proper balance between fair trial and lawyers’ free speech.”).
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. at 145 (Proposed Final Draft
1981) (“The formulation in this Rule incorporates a standard approximating clear and present
danger . . . .”).
146. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000).
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147
The court
between these two standards is not clear. . . .”
“assume[d]” that substantial likelihood was somehow a more
stringent test, but it never resolved its confusion between the two.148
Four years later, the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama considered a gag order in the prosecution of Richard
Scrushy, the former CEO of Healthsouth.149 The court imposed an
order under the substantial likelihood standard, but noted that it, too,
“cannot determine whether ‘reasonable likelihood’ or ‘substantial
likelihood’ makes much difference.”150
This kind of confusion suggests that the meaning of substantial
likelihood has shifted. Some individual judges may be able to
distinguish substantial likelihood from reasonable likelihood, but for
others, little or no difference may exist. The dictionary definition of
“substantial” does not clearly distinguish it.151 Though this possibility
does not undermine the reasoning in Gentile, it does suggest an
infirmity in the doctrine. At the very least, the confusion presents
additional doubt about the limitations courts can place on trial
participants’ extrajudicial speech.

III. A CAUTION AGAINST REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
When trial participants desire to speak publicly about court
cases, their right to speak freely clashes with fair trial concerns.152
“[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of
our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between
them.”153 But courts must balance these interests, and as Part II
described, the approaches taken have been haphazard and
inconsistent. Mindful of the legal uncertainty facing trial participants,
appellate courts should clarify the law. In doing so, they should be
particularly mindful of two sets of considerations, each of which tends
to discount speech interests: the chilling effect of the collateral bar
rule and the inherently speculative nature of speech restrictions.

147. Id. at 427.
148. Id.
149. United States v. Scrushy, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6711, at *1–3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 13,
2004).
150. Id. at *12.
151. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
153. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
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A. The Contempt Power and the Collateral Bar Rule
Enforcement of court-ordered restrictions on trial participant
speech by use of the contempt power poses problems for would-be
speakers. First, punishment by contempt does not provide any
interinstitutional limitations, which are present for many other
government speech restrictions. An administrative order refusing to
grant a license for a parade or protest, for example, is a decision made
by one branch of the government and enforced by another, the
courts.154 Likewise, when considering a statute that limits speech,155
courts provide an independent check on the legislature. In this role,
the courts review decisions already made by other institutions,
checking those institutions’ speech-restrictive powers.
In the case of court-ordered speech restrictions, no coordinate
institution serves as a check on the court’s order or rule. The court
issues the command. When the court suspects a violation, it sets the
prosecution in motion. Finally, it adjudicates the dispute and imposes
156
a sentence. The court will ensure compliance with the order for two
reasons. First, the court has already determined in the original order
that compliance is necessary for the administration of justice.157
Second, a violation may be perceived as a rebuke to the power of the
158
court, ensuring swift and sure enforcement.
This power is checked to the extent that decisions of trial courts
can be reviewed by appellate courts, but a limitation on appellate
review of speech restrictions exists. The collateral bar rule precludes
appellate courts from considering the validity of the underlying order
once it has been violated. Famously applied in the case of Walker v.

154. Cf. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (ruling
unconstitutional an injunction preventing a white supremacist rally because the court issued the
injunction without a full adversarial hearing giving the white supremacist group the opportunity
to advance its interests before the independent tribunal).
155. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 700 (1931) (considering a
classical prior restraint in which a statute allowed lawsuits asking courts to enjoin publication of
newspapers for the publication of scandalous material).
156. The United States Congress is expressly prohibited from this sort of self-enforcement.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”).
157. See Blasi, supra note 107, at 43–47, 61 (explaining that the same judge who ruled
against the speaker in the original order is also often the one responsible for the order’s
enforcement).
158. See id. (observing that “contempt proceedings are streamlined, with the judge (who has
ruled against the speakers at the issuance stage and who may have instigated the prosecution)
not always assuming the role of impartial arbiter” and that “[t]he swiftness and sureness of
sanctions” might therefore chill speech).
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159
City of Birmingham, the rule precluded civil rights protesters from
challenging an order riddled with “substantial constitutional issues.”160
Because the protesters had ignored the trial court’s order, the
161
Supreme Court refused to reverse the contempt sanctions. Out of
respect for the rule of the trial court, the Supreme Court held that
litigants must exhaust their claims before violating the order.162 In
Walker, the failure to proceed in this manner resulted in the forfeiture
163
of the underlying constitutional claim.
In this way, the collateral bar rule prevents a full adjudication of
the speaker’s claims after all the information has been aired and the
facts have been presented: When a trial participant feels strongly
enough to appeal the order, and refrain from speaking while doing so,
the appellate court will consider the order without knowing how it is
164
received by the public at large. Trial participants who do not appeal
a court order but choose to violate it, however, lose the ability to
165
appeal altogether.
In the context of speech restraints, this limitation on appeals
cautions litigants to steer clear of speech that a judge could perceive
as violative of a court order. Not only can the judge exact swift
punishment through contempt, but the collateral bar rule will prevent
166
the subsequent adjudication of the underlying court order. Because
of the probability of self-censorship caused by the contempt power

159. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
160. Id. at 316.
161. Id. at 315–17.
162. Id. at 317–21.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 318 (“This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture if the
petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts . . . .”).
165. See id. at 317–21 (“This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally
free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets.”).
166. Some courts have refused to apply the collateral bar rule to violations of court rules. In
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, for example, the Seventh Circuit refrained from calling
the local court “no-comment” rule at issue a prior restraint because it would not apply the
collateral bar rule to a violation of the no-comment rule. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 247–49 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971)). Other circuits,
however, apply the collateral bar rule to violations of court rules. E.g., United States v. Cutler,
815 F. Supp. 599, 610–11 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Treating court publicity rules differently than judgeissued orders by refusing to apply the collateral bar rule may justify a different standard for this
kind of speech restriction, but it may not. The effect of the collateral bar rule is one of several
considerations at stake. Despite its refusal to recognize the applicability of the collateral bar
rule, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless applied strict scrutiny in Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 252–59.
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and the collateral bar rule, courts should be reluctant to impose this
kind of restriction.
B. Speculation, Speech Benefits, and the Costs to Adjudication
Decisions to restrain the speech of trial participants are
inherently speculative. Judges who issue gag orders or who remind
trial participants that they will enforce court rules engage in a thought
process that lacks certainty at a number of steps. First, they must
speculate about whether the trial participants will speak about the
case at all. Then, they must consider whether the content of the
speech will be so prejudicial that anyone who hears it will be
precluded from a jury. Finally, judges must presume that the media
will communicate the statements to more than a trivial number of
persons. Judges simply cannot know these things with certainty; they
are not subject to proof. As the Nebraska Press Court wrote, “[T]he
harm to a fair trial that might otherwise eventuate from publications
which are suppressed pursuant to [court] orders . . . must inherently
remain speculative.”167
Inherent speculation by itself, however, demands no particular
level of scrutiny. It is simply a condition of adjudication: courts must
make decisions without full information. Rules that would have
judges resolve this uncertainty always in favor of fair trials reflect
important values; so do rules that would have judges always protect
168
speech. Consideration of the costs and benefits of speech helps
complete the picture.
A judge contemplating speech restrictions will know well the
costs that speech entails. The mechanisms available to remedy
extrajudicial statements must be imposed by the judge. All these
mechanisms, particularly voir dire and continuances, influence the
court’s docket—to which judges are necessarily attuned. Moreover,
should a judge make the wrong choice, and an appellate court reverse
the trial outcome, the costs in time and effort would increase on
retrial, imposing an obvious toll on the administration of the court.
The precise extent of these costs will not be known in any given case;
the trial judge, however, will have no trouble understanding the ways
in which these costs will add to an already crowded docket.

167. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 599 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
168. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
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On the other side of the ledger, the benefits of speech are truly
speculative. Even presuming the speech is received by a wide
audience, the speech effects will depend on the persuasiveness of the
arguments, the delivery of the speaker, and whether other
contemporary events crowd out its effect, leading recipients to
remember it or forget about it.169 The value of the speech may be
temporal, with the benefits not accruing for months or years as its
message is revisited by future generations of litigants, voters, and
others.170 Finally, whereas the costs of speech are imposed on the
court and a limited group of individuals associated with the court, the
benefits are widely dispersed across many hundreds or thousands or
millions of people.171 No full accounting of the benefits of speech can
be had, and no judge would be able to look far enough afield to come
close.172
Not surprisingly, many judges would resolve the uncertainties by
discounting the dispersed and unknowable benefits of speech and
173
focusing instead on the relatively familiar and immediate costs. To
ensure that speech concerns receive sufficient consideration, the
standards by which courts measure speech restrictions should account
for these imbalances. Doing so does not elevate the First Amendment
174
over the right to a fair trial. To the contrary, it helps guarantee an
even and fair consideration of the broader consequences of speech

169. Cf. Richard E. Petty, Gary L. Wells & Timothy C. Bock, Distraction Can Enhance or
Reduce Yielding to Propaganda: Thought Disruption Versus Effort Justification, 34 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 874–84 (1976) (describing the “disruption hypothesis” and its
effects on persuasion).
170. Cf. Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From “Collective
Memory” to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
SOCIOLOGY 105, 115–27 (1998) (describing how society characterizes events differently over
time).
171. Id.
172. Again, a distinction may appear between court rules and the other types of restrictions.
With court rules, the dangers of speech are not immediate at the time the rules are being
promulgated. This would seem to suggest that they may be different in kind from other
restrictions. Court rules, however, are still promulgated by judges, taking into account their
familiar concerns. Moreover, a judge, deciding whether to enforce the rule, will be faced with
the choice of immediate, focused costs or distant, diffuse benefits.
173. Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 135 (D. D. Raphael & A. L.
MacFie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) (“[T]he loss or gain of a very small interest of our
own appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or sorrow, a
much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern of another with whom we have
no particular connexion.”).
174. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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bearing on these rights, “two of the most cherished policies of our
175
civilization.”
*

*

*

When coupled with the use of the contempt power and the
collateral bar rule, the speculative nature of court-ordered restrictions
on trial participant speech suggests that courts should impose
restrictions on speech only with caution. Precluding regulation based
only on a reasonable likelihood of scrutiny assures caution and
properly regards free speech concerns along with fair trial concerns.
This Note accepts that the substantial likelihood standard could
sufficiently balance these interests if it is a distinct form of
intermediate scrutiny.176 Because some courts, however, have
demonstrated an inability to differentiate the substantial likelihood
177
standard from the reasonable likelihood standard, distinguishing
between the two is a challenge courts should undertake, to ensure
that the reasonable likelihood standard is not adopted under a
different name.
CONCLUSION
Court-ordered restrictions on trial participant speech are more
visible than ever. In cases such as the Enron trial, the Laci Peterson
murder trial, the Michael Jackson trial, the Kobe Bryant rape trial,
and the Duke Lacrosse case, judges must decide whether to limit the
speech of trial participants. When judges impose restrictions, they risk
curtailing discussion and debate about important events of public
concern. This Note illustrates why courts ought to reject the
reasonable likelihood standard in favor of heightened scrutiny when
considering restrictions on trial participants’ extrajudicial speech. The
175. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941). For more general concerns about the
speculative nature of First Amendment adjudication, consider Blasi, supra note 107, at 49–54.
“It is the cancer of tidy doctrine, feeding on its internal logic, that is most to be feared in the
ultrahazardous realm of speech regulation. Adjudication in the abstract, for which reality testing
is at a minimum, can be a breeding ground for tidy doctrine.” Id. at 53. Though the analysis
presented here is not intended to track Professor Blasi’s, it has been largely influenced by the
section of his paper entitled “Adjudication in the Abstract.” Id. at 49–54; cf. John Calvin
Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 430 n.67 (1983) (calling the speculative
nature of court-ordered injunction one of the “strongest” arguments for “special hostility to
injunctions”).
176. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.B.
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contempt power and the collateral bar rule dangerously chill speech,
and the imposition of court-ordered speech restrictions engages
courts in a purely speculative affair, the outcome of which is likely to
favor the immediate and familiar costs to adjudication rather than
unknown and diffuse benefits. Of equal importance, this Note
demonstrates the extraordinary uncertainty facing trial participants
who may want to speak about their cases. Lower courts are divided in
the standards they apply and in the reasons they choose to apply
those standards. They have expressed confusion about the meaning of
the substantial likelihood standard by equating it with the reasonable
likelihood standard that is most permissive of speech restrictions.
Guidance from the courts would be helpful, to articulate how these
two standards differ.

